Trade for the Environment: Transboundary Hazardous Waste Movements After the Basel Convention

Abstract

AbstractInternational institutions are important regulators of the trade–environment relationship. Many of them deploy trade measures for environmental purposes, with mixed results. The Basel Convention is one case where trade restrictions have not succeeded in curbing movements of hazardous waste or protecting vulnerable countries from waste dumping. Current literature emphasizes North–South conflict under the Basel Convention as a main reason for these shortcomings. This paper returns to the fundamental question as to why countries engage in this trade. It contends that hazardous wastes are not only characterized by their environmental impacts, but are also distinct in the ways they are generated, distributed, and managed. I argue that global economic integration has commodified these wastes, and countries are increasingly diverging on their views of hazardous materials. This paper draws from the under‐utilized Basel Convention Database and other sources to piece together a holistic picture of the global hazardous waste movements. It identifies three types of countries with distinct trade orientations: industrialized countries trading the largest amounts of hazardous wastes and with considerable specialization; newly industrializing countries as influential players in hazardous waste generation and management; and least developed countries, which oppose waste trade yet suffer from waste dumping. As globalization deepens, management of hazardous wastes may require extensive trade of hazardous materials between countries of varying capabilities and interests. Contrary to its current trade minimization approach based on a crude North–South dichotomy, the Basel Convention may benefit from an approach that motivates capable countries to import wastes and one that builds capacity for intended waste importers.