Abstract

This paper applies the "conflict-trade" international relations model to the question of labor unrest. Labor unrest is a particular form of conflict prevalent within the U.S. labor market. Labor unrest manifests itself when union workers strike for better wages and benefits during labor corur-act negotiations. The question addressed is why the more educated, less menial workers unionize and strike less. The conflict-trade model argues that dyads trading with each other engage in less conflict. More educated professional and managerial workers engage in more training. The costs and benefits of this training are shared between employers and employees. This sharing is a form of trade, which according to the conflict-trade model reduces worker-firm conflict more for professional-managerial workers than for menial workers. As such, union membership and strike activity are less premlem among the more skilled more educated workforce. The paper is interdisciplinary because it links a trade-based international relations model to labor relations.

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