Tractarian Form as the Precursor to Forms of Life

Chon Tejedor

doi:10.15845/nwr.v4i0.3358

Abstract

Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase ‘form of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings. Some univocal interpreters suggest that, for Wittgenstein, ‘form of life’ captures a uniquely biological notion: the biologically human form of life. Others suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of differently enculturated forms of human life. Non-univocal interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein does not use ‘form of life’ univocally, but that he uses it sometimes to highlight a cluster of biological notions and sometimes a cluster of cultural ones. The debate between univocal and non-univocal readers has generated a raft of intricate, illuminating literature on both sides. If it remains to an extent open, it is partly as a result of the fact that the textual evidence available on this matter, in Wittgenstein’s later published and unpublished writings, is so limited. In this paper, I argue that considering Wittgenstein’s earlier treatment of ‘form’ can help to shed light on his later treatment of ‘form of life’. More specifically I argue that revisiting the Tractatus’ treatment of ‘form’ gives us – perhaps surprisingly – reasons to support a non-univocal later reading of ‘forms of life’.

Highlights

Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase ‘form of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings
Some univocal interpreters suggest that, for Wittgenstein, ‘form of life’ captures a uniquely biological notion: the biologically human form of life. Others suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of differently enculturated forms of human life
Non-univocal interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein does not use ‘form of life’ univocally, but that he uses it sometimes to highlight a cluster of biological notions and sometimes a cluster of cultural ones

Summary

Introduction

Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase ‘form of life’ is used univocally in Wittgenstein’s later writings. What is more: the decision not to use this expression univocally is not mere stylistic accident or terminological sloppiness on Wittgenstein’s part, but rather the expression of a central underlying commitment: the commitment to resisting sharp theoretical divides between the biological and the cultural, to the extent of even positing an internal relation (rather than a division) between the two (Majetschak 2010: 75-77) This debate has generated a raft of intricate, illuminating literature on both sides. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.) (PI 23 [my italics in the first instance]) This explicit reference to the Tractatus in PI 23 is often read as suggesting a straightforward disanalogy between Wittgenstein’s earlier and later approaches to language: in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein is blind to the ‘multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence’; in the Philosophical Investigations, by contrast, he embraces this multiplicity..

The Tractatus on the Forms of Pictures3

Ineffability and the Forms of the Natural Sciences

21 I defend this further in Tejedor 2015

Representational systems conditioned – but not justified – by reality

From Tractarian forms to forms of life