Tracking the Pendulum Swing on Legislative Entrenchment in New Zealand

Abstract

Abstract When New Zealand’s Parliament legislates to the effect that law on some particular matter may only be enacted using a mandated procedure, can the New Zealand judiciary enforce this provision against a future Parliament that fails to comply with it? Following the Supreme Court’s recent refusal to conclusively decide this question, we examine why it still remains controversial in New Zealand. We first set the issue in a wider constitutional framework, explaining how such judicial enforcement requires considering the nature of parliamentary sovereignty and the role of the courts in defining this. The way in which the matter has been addressed over time in New Zealand and elsewhere—the pendulum swing of constitutional understandings, to use the Supreme Court’s term—is then outlined. We draw on this analysis to examine why the Supreme Court felt unable to resolve the particular question of enforceability, while also raising an as-yet unexamined question as to how such enforcement implicates the statutorily guaranteed parliamentary privilege of non-interference in the internal affairs of the House. We conclude that because it is unlikely this issue will come before the courts again in the near term, continued uncertainty over the law in this area is set to continue.