Abstract

How was it possible that one of America’s most prominent government agencies resorted to torture when interrogating terror suspects in the 2000s? And how is it possible that torture continues to be discussed and practiced as a legitimate means to acquire information? We address these questions by conducting a longitudinal case study of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program. Drawing on rich archival data, we show how the advocates of torture mobilized the desirable ends of national security to justify a hitherto illegitimate means. By doing so, advocates were able to mobilize support by experts, to stifle the sway of moral principles, and to recategorize torture as efficient, “enhanced” and thus legitimate interrogation techniques. While our study draws on an unconventional setting, it has critical implications for organization theory. Specifically, our research elucidates that legitimacy is grounded in different legitimacy criteria (consequential, principle-based, and regulatory) which constitute a dynamic configuration of mutually dependent relationships. In our context, key actors within the CIA employed a set of strategies (validation, recategorization, and theorization) to construe torture as legitimate. Conceptualizing legitimacy as the strategic balancing of different criteria adds depth and nuance to existing legitimacy research which previously has assumed that legitimacy criteria are fixed and audience-specific.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call