Abstract
Personhood is a foundational concept for legal order. Who counts as a person in law, is to a large extent conventional. At the same time, such legal determinations rely on deep philosophical underpinnings of the arrangements of positive law. For centuries, such meta-legal assumptions have been including a form of juridical humanism making human interests the sole and ultimate good that the law serves. Contemporary developments in natural science, however, undermine ever more the crucial beliefs on which such humanism has been based and compel imminent revision of some core philosophical and ethical foundations of the law. This paper examines this phenomenon and its potential solutions. It outlines the idea of the modest naturalisation of the legal approach to personhood, as opposed to its more extreme versions, as the optimal way to reconcile scientific advancements with the ethical and pragmatic concerns that jurisprudence must also address.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
