Abstract

Dual-use biotechnology faces the risks of availability, novel biological agents, knowledge, normative, and other dual-use risks. If left unchecked, these may destroy human living conditions and social order. Despite the benefits of dual-use technology, good governance is needed to mitigate its risks. The predicaments facing all governments in managing the dual-use risks of biotechnology deserve special attention. On the one hand, the information asymmetry risk of dual-use biotechnology prevents the traditional self-governance model in the field of biotechnology from playing its role. On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology. Therefore, we argue that governance of the dual-use risks of biotechnology should avoid the traditional bottom-up or top-down modes. We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed. The first stage is to achieve consensus on a broad governance framework with open-ended principles. The second stage is for countries to take action based on local conditions and the open-ended framework. The third stage is to establish a dynamic consultation mechanism for transnational information sharing and action review. The fourth and final stage is to evaluate and revise the global governance framework.

Highlights

  • On the other hand, top-down public regulation often lags behind technological iteration due to the difficulty of predicting the human-made risks of dual-use biotechnology

  • We suggest the governance for dual-use biotechnology could be improved if the four-stage experimentalist governance model is followed

  • What are the risks of dual-use biotechnology? What are the difficulties and challenges in the current risk management system and can they be resolved? This paper explores these questions to deepen our understanding of the risks of dual-use biotechnology and countermeasures so that such technology can benefit sustainable development of humanity

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Summary

Definition of “Dual-Use Biotechnology”

“dual-use” biotechnology refers to both civilian and military technology [1]. Dual-use biotechnology has benefits (such as promoting scientific progress or improving public health) and has the potential for malicious abuse or misuse (such as bioterrorism). NSABB has adopted a strategy of determining a limited scope of knowledge, products or technologies produced by life science research that is most likely to be misused to threaten national biosafety. This part of research is referred to as “dual-use research concerns”, and encompasses 15 key biological agents or toxins and seven types of dual-use research [4]

Four Types of Risks of Dual-Use Biotechnology
Accessibility Risks
Novel Biological Agent Risks
Knowledge Risks
Normative Risks
National Responses to Dual-Use Risks of Biotechnology
Double Predicament
Predicament 1
Predicament 2
Experimentalist Governance Framework
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Conclusions
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