TOWARDS EXPLAINING SOVIET FAMINE OF 1931–3: POLITICAL AND NATURAL FACTORS IN PERSPECTIVE1

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the causes of the great Soviet famine of 1931–3 in terms of a complex of factors operating at different times. It begins with a brief description of the historical patterns of food supply and the causes of earlier Russian famines, which it argues are important for understanding the 1931–3 famine. The location and timing of the separate stages of the famine and the increases in mortality associated with these separate stages are charted. Explanations of the famine, made by Mace, Conquest, Penner, and Tauger are considered. But it is argued that the famine needs to be understood as a complex of separate crises that jointly contributed to leaving a dangerously low supply of food for certain groups of the population. In the first stage, 1928–31, it was the urban population and groups of Kazakh nomads that were most at risk. The drought of 1931 and severe grain collection policies shifted the incidence of the famine to produce distress in many rural areas including Ukraine in the first half of 1932. Extremely high mortality was avoided at this time only by releases of grain reserves. A second harvest failure of 1932, caused by a complex of agro-technological, natural, and other factors, in association with continued harsh procurements policy produced greater shortages at a time when reserves were low. With the government's refusal to acknowledge famine and to seek external assistance, mortality rose sharply in many rural areas. An appendix considers the data problems in some detail.