Abstract
This paper contributes to our understanding of interest intermediation structures in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and, specifically, whether, which, how and to what extent organized interests are incorporated into policy-making processes. Unlike previous studies primarily focusing on patterns of economic coordination (Jahn 2016), we focus on energy policy-making in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. We address the extent to which these energy interest intermediation systems are gravitating towards a more corporatist policy-making paradigm and whether corporatist arrangements have been dismantled in view of the new wave of national conservatism in CEE. We offer a complex operationalization of corporatism based on concrete indicators and present the results of a survey of energy interest groups operating in the region. It covers questions regarding interest intermediation between the organized interests and the government, regulatory authorities as well as the degree of policy coordination and political exchange with the state and between rivalling organizations, enabling us to derive a “corporatism score” for each national institutional setting and discuss them in the light of Jahn’s (2016) corporatism rankings for the region. We show that—despite striking differences—at least rudimentary corporatist interest intermediation structures have emerged with some variations of pluralism and statism in all four countries.
Highlights
To what extent are organized interests given a voice in post-communist policy-making and how? This article focuses on the interactions between civil society organizations and the state in the energy sector
Instead of looking at concrete policies, we focus on the structures and forms of energy interest intermediation in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia
Jahn aimed to remedy these deficits, and included—for the first time— numerous Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries in his “corporatism” ranking for the time period 1960 to 20105: He spells out three components of corporatism: structure, i.e. peak organizations negotiating for their members; function, i.e. arrangements where governments intervene in wage bargaining, whereby unions are heavily involved in governmental decision-making; and scope, i.e. the coordination of wage bargaining and applicability of collective agreements to wider spheres of society
Summary
To what extent are organized interests given a voice in post-communist policy-making and how? This article focuses on the interactions between civil society organizations and the state in the energy sector. Is post-communist energy policy-making characterized by a pluralist “free-for-all” or, alternatively, a top-down, technocratic state-centred logic?. Most CEE countries find themselves in a difficult balance aiming to promote renewable, safe and diversified energy sources, while preventing mass unemployment through rapid de-carbonization. Against this background, the support of major interest organizations may be a crucial prerequisite for facilitating energy transitions and implementing reforms. Not least due to high employment in the sector (Frantál and Malý 2017), energy and its immediate ramifications for the environment and economic viability of CEE present a crucial case for examining the complexities of post-communist governance and advocacy patterns.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
