Towards an Electoral Union? National Electoral Models, Strategies, and Effects at the 2019 EP Election

Višeslav Raos

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3966257

Abstract

Since 1999, all member states have employed some form of proportional representation to elect representatives in the European Parliament. The introduction of Spitzenkandidaten and greater policy and campaigning coordination within Europarties sought to create a common European ground of party competition. However, the actual election of MEPs remains a national endeavor, determined by a national electoral framework. The electoral success of an Europarty in a given member state is shaped by the conditions set by the national electoral model for European elections. Different national models also give rise to different electoral strategies employed by parties wishing to maximize their number of MEPs. While electoral alliances might reflect cooperation of ideologically similar parties (such as list combinations in the Netherlands) or presidential majorities, like the coalition list of parties that support the French President, sometimes, especially in newer member states (e.g., Croatia), they might represent a strategic choice of ideologically divergent parties to work together in order to pass the threshold and win seats in the European Parliament. This paper seeks to compare different national playing grounds in which Europarties, i.e., their member parties compete, as well as electoral strategies that accompany such different frameworks. Apart from Ireland and Malta, which use the single transferable vote system, all other (current) member states use list proportional representation. However, the choice of a national electoral district or division in regional electoral constituencies can have a significant impact on electoral outcomes. Further, the employment of an electoral threshold and its interaction with district magnitude can create different electoral conditions. Finally, methods of seat allocation have an impact on prospects of smaller parties. A comparison of national electoral models will uncover different conditions and levels of (dis)proportionality that all weave together into the ultimate makeup of the European Parliament.

Highlights

Four decades after the introduction of direct election of national representatives in the common European Parliament (EP) and two decades after the adoption of proportional representation as the lowest common denominator for the election of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the 2019 EP election demonstrated that member states still employ a range of different electoral rules, while political parties competing in the respective national electoral arenas subscribe to dissimilar electoral strategies
The aim of this paper is to examine whether EP elections are conducted in a common, European political arena or are there still significant differences in electoral rules, strategies, and effects in individual member states
Regarding electoral effects, following in the footsteps of Farrell and Scully, this paper considers the effective number of (ENP (S)) and the level of disproportionality (Gallagher’s index)

Summary

Introduction

Four decades after the introduction of direct election of national representatives in the common European Parliament (EP) and two decades after the adoption of proportional representation as the lowest common denominator for the election of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), the 2019 EP election demonstrated that member states still employ a range of different electoral rules, while political parties competing in the respective national electoral arenas subscribe to dissimilar electoral strategies Within such a context, bold dreams of a creation of a common electoral space in the European Union, which would enable transnational policy advocacy and voter mobilization, remain hardly attainable. The question remains, how far are the EP elections from the establishment of such a common electoral arena.

Objectives

Discussion

Conclusion