Abstract

This chapter builds towards a wider theory combining a version of common sense morality with a particular rule consequentialist justification. It asks whether the most plausible principles of common sense morality can all be given some further justification, which may appeal to some feature that these principles have in common. On one plausible hypothesis, the best principles of common sense morality are also the principles whose acceptance would on the whole make things go best. We might justifiably accept this hypothesis. The two parts of this theory, furthermore, would achieve more by being combined. Rule consequentialism would be strengthened if this theory supports that seems to be the best version of common sense morality. This version of Common Sense Morality would be similarly strengthened if it can be plausibly supported in this rule consequentialist way.

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