Abstract
If the burden of the previous chapter was to deal with the second of the five principal tasks facing the common sense philosopher, namely, justifying the claim that common sense beliefs ought to be treated as default positions, then the object of this chapter and the next is to broach the third of these tasks, that is, to provide a general account of what Moore took to be the most striking fact about the work of many philosophers. Moore writes It seems to me that what is most amazing and most interesting about the views of many philosophers is the way in which they go beyond or positively contradict the views of Common Sense: they profess to know that there are in the Universe most important kinds of things, which Common Sense does not profess to know of, and also they profess to know that there are not in the Universe (or, at least, that, if there are, we do not know it), things of the existence of which Common Sense is most sure. (1965, p. 2)
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.