Towards a Prudential-Ordinative Understanding of Providence

Abstract

Abstract In the history of the doctrine of providence and its explication, there are at least two major Christian approaches: ‘actionistic’ and ‘prudential-ordinative’ providence. In contrast to the prevailing action-based, or ‘actionistic’, model, this chapter develops a ‘prudential-ordinative’ understanding of providence, by examining what is arguably the prime exemplification of this approach, Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine of providence, which is based on the virtue of prudence, not merely on human action. First, this chapter discusses the virtue of prudence and human providence as an analogy for divine providence. Next, it introduces the distinction between providence and government, as well as that between primary and secondary causation. Finally, the chapter addresses various objections brought forth against ‘double agency’. To this end, the chapter distinguishes Austin Farrer’s well-known theory of double agency from Aquinas’ approach, which, it is argued, is a decisively different account of ‘double agency’. Consequently, the objections raised against Farrer’s double agency do not eo ipso apply to Aquinas’ theory of secondary causation. In fact, the chapter shows that the major objections raised in the science and theology debate miss the so-called doctrine of divine application, which is essential to Aquinas’ theory of secondary causation and his account of providence.