Abstract

From a linguistic perspective, ‘truth’ is undoubtedly a pragmatic notion, as the truth of an utterance is not determined solely by its linguistic meaning, but is dependent upon the context in which it is uttered. Although pragmaticists have devoted some theoretical attention to factual truth, truth that is not established through comparison with an observable external reality remains comparatively under-theorised. This paper focuses on a particular kind of truth that falls within this category, namely non-fictional narrative truth. “Narrative truth” is defined as a judgement of verisimilitude accorded to the meaning of a narrative as a whole. This narrative meaning is neither rationally nor empirically verifiable, but rather arrived at by a hermeneutic process. The paper argues that certain criteria previously identified as influencing hearers’ perceptions of testimony also contribute to the creation of an impression of narrative truth. It then examines the position of these criteria within Gricean and relevance-theoretic pragmatic accounts of interpretation. Using as an illustrative example a transcription of a testimony presented to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the paper considers whether behaviour deemed ‘cooperative’ in typical conversational interaction is sufficient to yield an impression of a narrative’s truth in this particular domain. A principal finding is that adherence to the standard Gricean ‘recipe’ for cooperative conversational behaviour, with its prioritisation of truthfulness, fails to yield an impression of narrative truth. Relevance theory, on the other hand, which places equal emphasis on the form and content of utterances, more easily explains why the truth of certain kinds of narratives may be questioned. However, the criterion of relevance is also found to raise some complications, as what counts as ‘relevant’ differs across speakers and cultures. The paper concludes with a contemplation of the ethical issues raised when certain kinds of narrative are deemed ‘untruthful’ and remain figuratively unheard.

Highlights

  • Narratives, as Threadgold (2005:264) notes, have political consequences

  • Sociolinguistic work on narrative has been prolific, with considerable attention having been devoted to canonical narrative structure (e.g. Labov 1982 and Labov and Waletzky 1997; Thornborrow and Coates 2005 is an additional example of a collection of work on the sociolinguistics of narrative)

  • The aim of the paper is to take some preliminary steps towards a pragmatic theorisation of nonfictional narrative truth, by identifying certain features – some discursive, and some belonging to the cognitive environments of the narrative’s audience – that lend themselves to the creation of an impression of truth in the hearer

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Summary

Introduction

Narratives, as Threadgold (2005:264) notes, have political consequences. Certain storytellers have “the power to name, to create ‘official versions’, and to represent legitimate social worlds”, whilst others do not (Threadgold 2005:264). The aim of the paper is to take some preliminary steps towards a pragmatic theorisation of nonfictional narrative truth, by identifying certain features – some discursive, and some belonging to the cognitive environments of the narrative’s audience – that lend themselves to the creation of an impression of truth in the hearer. To this end, we analyse a transcription (presented and discussed in Krog, Mpolweni and Ratele 2009) of one particular testimony offered by Mrs Notrose Nobomvu Konile before South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The paper concludes with a brief meditation on the ethical issues raised when a testimony’s relevance, as defined by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995), is prioritised

Theoretical background
Speaker responsibility within Gricean- and relevance-theoretic frameworks
Narrative and truth inside and outside the context of the TRC hearings
Truth and the TRC
Mrs Konile’s narrative
A Gricean approach to narrative truth in Mrs Konile’s testimony
A relevance-theoretic approach to narrative truth in Mrs Konile’s testimony
Cognitive environment and cognitive effects
Implications
Full Text
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