Towards a New Method of Constitutional Bargaining? The Role and Impact of EU Institutions in the IGC and Convention Method of Treaty Reform

Abstract

This paper looks at the impact of the change from negotiating EU treaty reform within intergovernmental conferences to the new convention method. As most existing studies of treaty reform explain actor influence based exclusively upon relative actor power and preferences prior to negotiation, in effect 'black boxing' the actual negotiation process, a bargaining model is created that theorizes on the impact of the change in negotiating context and conduct of negotiations for the ability of actor to translate bargaining resources into influence. The paper then describes three 'ideal types' of negotiating treaty reform, and the proceeds to investigate the opportunities for influence for EU institutions that each type of negotiating method opens. The paper finds that while the Council Secretariat has traditionally had many possibilities to gain influence in treaty reform negotiations, the new convention method had opened up many opportunities for both the Commission, and especially the European Parliament (EP), to gain influence. Yet to have influence these possibilities must be translated into real influence through the successful use of appropriate strategies in the negotiations. In the present European Convention, while the Commission has had too ambitious and often conflicting positions, central members of the EP delegation have had up to now relative success in building coalitions around their positions, although it is still too early to conclude on whether the MEP's will prove successful in translating their bargaining resources into influence over the final Constitutional Treaty. The conclusions point to the necessity for students of treaty reform of opening up the 'black box' of the actual treaty reform process to investigate how the context and conduct of negotiations matter – enabling us to better explain which actors won in a treaty reform negotiation and why.