Abstract

On 10 and 11 September 1994 Pope John Paul 11 visited Croatia. His planned visit to Sarajevo on 8 September unfortunately had to be cancelled at the last minute on advice from the UN. It was not possible, therefore, for the pope to express his solidarity with the population of this besieged city and the people of Bosnia-Hercegovina by means of a personal visit. The postponement of the papal visit was a huge disappointment for everyone who is concerned for the survival of Bosnia-Hercegovina. It was quite obvious who was opposed to this visit and why: the leader of the Bosnian Serbs had uttered threats, in familiar style laying advance blame on the Muslim community in Bosnia for any terrorist attack on the pope's life. Notwithstanding this major disappointment the papal visit to Croatia was of the utmost importance. To grasp its significance one has to know something about the long debates in Yugoslav society in the 1980s about an eventual visit of the pope to Yugoslavia. 'The time is not ripe yet' was the standard answer from the secular authorities to the Roman Catholic Church, which longed for such a visit to take place. Obstacles from the point of view of the authorities included: the wounds of the Second World War; the polemics on the Jasenovac concentration camp; the Stepinac case; the fear that (as in Poland) the visit could have undesired political effects by stimulating national feelings, this time on the part of the Croats; and continuing tension between church and state on national and human rights issues. Those in power obviously also thought that such a visit could have a destabilising effect on the country. It was only after the recognition of an independent Croatian state that a papal visit to Croatia became a realistic option. There is no doubt that Pope John Paul 11 had wanted to go to Belgrade as well as Zagreb and Sarajevo and to visit the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the previous year the patriarchs of Constantinople and Moscow had both been in Belgrade. A meeting there between the pope and the leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church would have underlined that as far as the Holy See is concerned the improvement of ecumenical relations with the Orthodox has top priority. It is a well-known fact that the Orthodox churches, especially in Russia and Serbia, are very displeased with Vatican policy towards what they see very clearly as 'Orthodox nations and territories'. Accusations of proselytisation have become obstacles to the official theological dialogue between these churches which started in 1980. The Holy See is very anxious to convince the

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