Abstract
ABSTRACTThis is an attempt to formulate a conditional model of coalition formation. Predictions from this model are tested against data on coalition formation in Dutch local government in 1982. Starting from a simple model of the behaviour of party politicians, it is assumed that the coalition behaviour of parties depends on the competitiveness of the (local) political system. The choice of a coalition strategy (minimizing size, minimizing policy range or proportional representation) is contingent upon two dimensions of the competitiveness of local politics. These are the amount of electoral volatility and the extent to which local election results follow national trends. Our conditional theory predicts different coalition behaviour in polities differing with regard to these two factors. Though the hypothesis was falsified, a more detailed analysis showed that (local) political competitiveness did make a difference in the choice of at least some of the coalition strategies. These differences, moreover, were in line with what was to be expected from the theoretical model.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
