Toward avoiding an empirical march to nowhere.

Abstract

As social scientists we want to make contributions that can help us better understand and possibly change the world, even if in small ways. We endeavor—in our field of psychology of aesthetics, creativity, and the arts—to understand and contribute insights into fundamental and complex aspects of the human experience. In my new role as Editor for the Journal of Creative Behavior (JCB), my editorial team and I have a unique opportunity and responsibility to support this goal. As the oldest journal dedicated to creativity research, we aim to continue the journal’s legacy as one of the primary outlets where scholars turn to share their contributions. We also hope to do our part to ensure that the work published in our journal is meaningful and of the highest quality. Now is as exciting a time as ever to be a scholar who studies aesthetics, creativity, and the arts. Our field is burgeoning with activity. It seems timely, therefore, that Makel’s (2014) article calls us to start taking stock of where we are and how we might better ensure that our efforts are headed in meaningful directions. The task that Makel sets for us is to reflect on how our “empirical march” toward understanding is impeded by bias and error in the research we conduct and in the norms of disseminating our work. He points out common pitfalls that can result in bias and error and offers suggestions aimed at establishing a more unified approach for addressing these problems. Makel’s article represents a potentially important catalyst for our field. Beyond sparking initial conversations and responses in this issue of Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, his article may pay out in helping initiate changes that can improve and strengthen the knowledge we generate through our scholarly efforts. In order for this to happen, however, I believe we need to zoom out a bit and reflect on the broader terrain of our scholarly endeavors. Makel meets us at a specific juncture in our scholarly effort: the deductive and (dis)confirmatory phase of our work. It is there that he couches his arguments. His ultimate aim is to “increase the tempo of our march by decreasing bias and error and increasing understanding about generalizability and boundary conditions of constructs.” To be sure, without shoring up our confirmatory efforts our progress will be slowed. However, aiming to increase the tempo of