Toward an Objectivist Ethic

Abstract

IN THIS paper I shall argue that moral language is conceptually tied to an objectivist meta-ethic, and that there are no logical impediments to such a meta-ethic. As it is often claimed that there are serious logical difficulties in the way both of the objectivist epistemology and also of its ontology, I shall examine the nature of the activity of intuitive apprehension and explore the nature of the objective commitment of an objectivist meta-ethic. I shall not be claiming to show that ethical objectivism is true, for that would involve showing that all alternative accounts-in particular, theories such as subjectivism and relativism-are false. As I have endeavored elsewhere to show how arguments against such theories would proceed, I shall not attempt to set them out here.' Again, I shall not engage in normative ethics and will confine myself to two moral truths: that the elimination of avoidable suffering is right and obligatory, and that the killing of human beings is wrong. Again, I have indicated elsewhere how I should argue in support of a pluralist, deontological ethic, akin to that of Ross, against any form of ethical monism.2