Toward an Ethics of Character

Abstract

No ETHIC is formulated in isolation from the social conditions of its time. The contemporary emphasis in Christian ethics on the dynamic and self-creating nature of man is a reflection of the kind of society in which we live. Perhaps our ancestors were born to pre-established roles in a world where faithfulness to those roles guaranteed the fulfilment of moral duty. But we are born into a social world that forces us to be free, to be autonomous; for now the moral imperative is to actually fashion our lives by choosing among the numerous alternatives our social world presents to us. In such a world it is not surprising that current moral discourse employs the language of freedom and responsibility to focus on man as self-creator. The moral life is not constituted by correspondence to an objective moral order; rather it is to be constantly readjusted to the nuances and ambiguities of our ethical choices and experiences. Modern ethicists recognize that there is often more to our moral situation than our and rules contain; so much of our significant moral experience and life simply does not fall within the areas marked off by clearly defined roles or principles. names the fact that often we are simply forced to fall back on ourselves in order to make decisions that have no relationship to objective standards of right and wrong. In a social situation that seems to force the individual to be on his own, it is no surprise that the subject matter of ethics is centered around problems/' i.e., situations in which it is difficult to know what one should do. Ethical discussion then focuses on the best way to respond to such problems: Should an ethical decision be determined primarily in relation to and rules, or by a loving response to the peculiarities of the immediate situation? Those who argue for principles suggest that only their approach assures objectivity in morals, or that love is sentimentalized if it is not imprincipled. Contextualists maintain that adherence to results in a false security that makes one insensitive to the complexity of modern moral issues. 1 For a much fuller account of the idea of responsibility and its use in contemporary theological ethics, see Albert Jonsen, Responsibility in Modern Religious Ethics (Washington: Corpus, 1968). 2 For an extraordinarily perceptive article that makes this point in a philosophical context, see E. Pincoffs, Quandary Ethics, Mind 80 (1971) 552-71.