Toward a Skeptical Criticism of Transcendental Pragmatics

Abstract

My subject is the contemporary attempts, and more precisely K. O. Apel's, that aim at the refoundation of rationality within a communicational framework. 1 I want to show that this task, insofar as it aims at being radical, insofar as it is "transcendental pragmatics," is the target of criticisms that a skepticism always raises against the doctrines purporting to be built upon a foundation wholly devoid of presupposition. 2 It so happens that Apel's doctrine—in a manner more systematic than that of F. Jacques or Habermas—makes explicit the conditions of its own constitution. It does so through the overthrow of skeptical objections that aim at a refutation of its radical attempt at a transcendental foundation: in Apel's eyes, the objection of the relativist or of the skeptic, because it contains an inner contradiction (a "performative self-contradiction") a contrario ensures the absolute validity of his universal pragmatic principle. If this use of skepticism constitutes the spring of the argumentation and the cornerstone of the systematic edifice Apel built, a skeptical overthrow of his overthrow will demonstrate the fragile and unsteady nature of its transcendental ambitions. It will then become impossible to associate the communicative activity with a horizon of ethical presuppositions that guarantee the success of discussion and of negotiation. It is the legitimacy of this foundationalism that we propose to contest in order to undermine transcendental theories of discourse ethics.