Toward a political economy of corporate governance change and stability in family business groups

Abstract

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to elaborate a political economy of corporate governance (CG) change and stability in family business groups (BGs) and assist in explaining why certain CG reforms fail in one context but work in others.Design/methodology/approachThree BGs in Bangladesh are studied. A mixture of data sources is used, namely interviews, observations of practices, historical documentation, company reports and research papers and theses. The results are analysed by applying Archer’s morphogenetic approach, focussing on both macro- and micro-processes of change.FindingsA newly-adopted CG framework, which created incentives and pressures for family directors to act in the best interests of general shareholders, did not seem to alter apparently simple but complex internal structural set-ups. Thus, regulatory efforts to empower general shareholders did not produce the expected results. Following Archer’s morphogenetic approach, the authors identify key structural conditioning or emergent properties and agential strategies to explain why and how BGs opted for symbolic compliance and achieved lax regulation and enforcement.Research limitations/implicationsThe paper opens up a new methodological and theoretical space for future CG research, especially by applying a meta-theoretical guideline such as the morphogenetic approach, for nuanced explanation and a more inclusive understanding of CG practices, reform and change in different organisational and institutional settings.Originality/valueThe morphogenetic approach aids in developing a political economy of CG change and stability and provides a nuanced explanation of CG practices. This is illustrated through an exploration of CG change initiatives in Bangladeshi BGs.