Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is, first, to show that Russell’s 1903 theory of denoting exacerbated existing difficulties in his conception of logical analysis and, second, to suggest that it was nevertheless his commitment to preserving his conception of logical analysis that led him to the theory of descriptions by which he was able to dispense with his problematic denoting complexes. It was pointed out in the preceding chapter that the theory of descriptions enabled Russell to treat classes defined by propositional functions (classes) as incomplete symbols, thereby obviating the Contradiction which arose from introducing classes as entities into his logicist project. However, from the account Russell gives in OD of his motivations for the theory of descriptions, one does not receive the impression that the theory emerged from Russell’s attempt to solve the problems given rise to by his own approach to logical analysis, much less that he envisioned the theory as providing the technical apparatus to carry out logicist definitions.
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