Toward a new kalām cosmological argument

Benjamin Victor Waters

doi:10.1080/23311983.2015.1062461

Abstract

AbstractWilliam Lane Craig has revived interest in the medieval kalām argument to the point where it is now one of the most discussed arguments for God’s existence in the secondary literature. Still, the reception of Craig’s argument among philosophers of religion has been mostly critical. In the interest of developing an argument that more philosophers of religion would be inclined to support, I will lay the philosophical groundwork for a new kalām cosmological argument that, in contrast with Craig’s argument, does not adopt such controversial positions as the dynamic theory of time and the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite.

Highlights

Ever since the publication of The Kalām Cosmological Argument, Craig (1979) has notably revived interest in the medieval kalām argument to the point where it is by at least one count, the most discussed argument for God’s existence in the secondary literature
I suspect that more philosophers of religion would be inclined to support at least the purely philosophical aspect of Craig’s argument if it did not involve such controversial positions as the dynamic theory of time and the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite
In this space, I have attempted to lay the philosophical groundwork for a new kalām cosmological argument that, in contrast with Craig’s argument, does not adopt such controversial positions as the dynamic theory of time and the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite

Summary

Introduction

Ever since the publication of The Kalām Cosmological Argument, Craig (1979) has notably revived interest in the medieval kalām argument to the point where it is by at least one count, the most discussed argument for God’s existence in the secondary literature. In remarking on this phenomenon, Smith For many philosophers of religion, it would seem that Craig has managed to capture their interest in his argument, but not along with their support. I suspect that more philosophers of religion would be inclined to support at least the purely philosophical aspect of Craig’s argument if it did not involve such controversial positions as the dynamic theory of time and the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite. Craig has, to be sure, argued for both positions in his published work; the relevant issues are thorny and his arguments

PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT

Conclusion