Toward a Logic of Social Systems?

Abstract

The contributions to this Forum suggest that to take seriously Luhmann's thought bears the danger of buying into a “new” grand theory, a new universal hammer pushing us to a point where we have to ask ourselves whether we really want to see the world as a nail. The counter-arguments then either point to some forgotten ingredient (Hindess 2009; Robertson 2009; Thomas 2009) or to a multiplicity of existing rationalities and world views (Leander 2009), an entire box of different tools where the new “grand” theory looks like alchemy; maybe interesting if not mysterious but at the same time a fad from yesterday, esoteric and essentially dead. Reading the contributions, it is astonishing that one of the key terms Luhmann used to put systems theory on a completely different ontological and epistemological footing is not mentioned at all: autopoiesis (Luhmann 1995). Of course, it is beyond the scope of this contribution to discuss all its implications, but hopefully some remarks in this respect will alleviate some of the raised reservations. With the notion of autopoiesis, Luhmann separated the individual from the social and argued that society is a complex, meaning constituted system consisting of and reproduced by communication only. He thereby provides an avenue for a (radical) constructivist approach to conceptualize social processes that is open for self-referential thought and consequently directed against ideas of an external perspective or a social whole. For Luhmann, reality is never fixed or directly observable. I will argue in two steps: The first section shows why I do not think that systems theory per se adheres to a new form of rationalism or “scientism,” a renewed plea for the scientific method by giving up any autonomy for the social sciences. The second section uses the notion of autopoiesis to argue that systems …