Toward a Defence of Teleology

Abstract

Teleological theories comprise a type of theory about the criteria of moral rightness. Their common and peculiar feature lies in their claim that what makes the moral moral is exclusively the nonmoral good brought about. The moral, of course, extends beyond morally right acts and practices to morally good intentions, traits, acts, motives, and people; and teleological theories can be supplied as readily here as over the morally right. Thus a morally good trait is one, instantiations of which on the part of most people produce nonmoral good overall. I shall in fact concentrate, however, on the morally right, as it is here that the major problems are apparent. In the first section I survey theories of the criteria of moral rightness; in the next section I consider the objection to teleology that it is not exclusively the nonmoral which makes the moral moral, as this theory fails to cope with justice; in the final section I argue that a teleologist can cope with justice and discuss how to relate his theory to his account of other areas of moral discourse.