Abstract

1.IntroductionSince the wave of transitions to democracy that began in Latin America in the 1980s, scholarship on civil-military relations in the region has been concerned with the age-old question of how civilian governments can control the armed forces, in order to keep them centered on their professional roles in national defense and disinterested in politics. Among Latin American countries, Argentina has made the most far-reaching progress in establishing civilian control of the military (Pion-Berlin 2014: 64). Where once the Argentine military frequently intervened in politics (1930-32, 1943-46, 1955-58, 1963, 1966-73, 1976-83), for it to do so now has become virtually unthinkable. This was crucially apparent in 2001, during Argentina's most devastating and recent economic crisis, when the military did not intervene in any significant way - not even through public statements, or in private meetings with political candidates - in events of the crisis (Diamint 2006: 163). Enabling this restraint were nearly two decades of reform of the armed forces that included reduction of the institution's prerogatives, separation of the military from internal security roles, curtailment of military budgets, and divestment of the armed forces' extensive defense and industrial sector holdings. Since the crisis in 2001, further reforms aimed at resocialization of the armed forces were instituted, with the goal of creating who are both public servants specialized in the profession of national defense, and holders of obligations and rights substantially equal to those of all other citizens.Argentina's achievements in civilian control deserve attention - not only because they have gone farthest in the region, but because they were by no means inevitable. The process of establishing civilian control over the armed forces was long, complex, and often involved setbacks. As this paper lays out, the reform process proceeded through several stages, involving strategies of confrontation in the 1980s, incorporation in the 1990s, and subordination in the 2000s. Civilian leaders spent the first two decades in a long quest toward subordination, which was achieved through legal and institutional reforms centered on a combination of force restructuring, legal restrictions on military roles, and creation of an increasingly robust defense ministry. By the mid 2000s, they turned to further legal, gender normative, and educational innovations in an effort to create citizen soldiers, with the goal of making the armed forces a participant in the consolidation of democracy. Thus legal and institutional restructuring has led to efforts to promote a culture shift in the armed forces.If Argentina's achievements were by no means inevitable, they are also unexpected in the scholarly debates on civil-military relations in Latin America. The theoretical model of democratic civilian control that emerged in early scholarship on democratic transitions from military rule (Stepan 1988; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996) emphasizes that a comprehensive set of conditions must be met in order for the armed forces to serve in the context of a democratic state and society. This model requires not only the elimination of military prerogatives that give the armed forces autonomy from civilian oversight, but also the empowerment of civilians, through institutional capacity and technical know-how, to take an active role in defining the parameters for military actions. Democratic civilian control exists when the armed forces are constitutionally accountable to a democratically elected legislature and executive, which set legal guidelines for their conduct and oversee such conduct through an institutional framework (e.g., a civilian-led defense ministry). In this framework civilian authorities supervise the most significant areas of defense and military policy: they control defense budgets and defense policy, and they set parameters for the military's professional training, education, promotion policies, and military doctrine (Fitch 1998: 172; Diamint 1999: 29-30). …

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