Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups

Abstract

F OR SOME TIME NOW, systematic thinking about the nature of interest groups has centered on the logic of joining, and it has been structured by two popular theoretical perspectives: traditional pluralism and Olson's model of collective action.' These perspectives offer opposing views of the foundations of group politics. The pluralists claim that people join groups in support of group goals, while Olson counters that people join in response to private ("selective") benefits that are typically non political. The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that neither the pluralist nor the Olson position is entirely adequate, and that interest groups can be better understood by means of a broader perspective that fits these opposing views within a single framework. I will call this the "revised" perspective, because it derives from a revision of Olson's original model. The secondary purpose of the paper is to emphasize that a debate over group membership, however narrowly focused it may appear, is by implication a debate over a full range of organizational characteristics, and it should be recognized as such. In the analysis below, the three perspectives-pluralist, Olson, revised are treated separately. For each, the logic of membership is developed and its implications mapped out for basic aspects of organization: formation, maintenance, internal politics, and the