Abstract

AbstractDespite many reforms, evidence from the past decade proves the Italian fiscal policy still being “irresponsible.” The article understands the problem from a public choice perspective: irresponsibility is a natural result of unconstrained “raw politics,” yet proper institutional designs can bring it under control. It then presents qualitative data showing how Italian irresponsibility follows inappropriate constraints, and explains why the recent European provisions can support a fruitful institutional change.

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