Abstract
This paper uses matched employer–employee data to study the structure of managerial compensation. The evidence supports key predictions from tournament theory. First, the managerial pay differential between organizational levels is non-decreasing as one goes up the corporate ladder. This result is robust to controlling for human capital characteristics and firm fixed effects. I document a particularly large increment in the pay differential at the top of a firm's hierarchy. Second, the winner's prize in the CEO tournament increases with the number of competitors for the CEO position. Last, high wage dispersion is associated with high firm performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
