Total Warning

Abstract

It is explored[1] in what ways we can warn in order to protect our way of life and our critical infrastructures. From a methodological perspective, we could warn in four different ways. For to assess there is a threat, warning scenarios are composed for which critical indicators are developed. Subsequently, these critical indicators are monitored. It seems suited for a broad range of issues where access to information is limited. For to assess there is no threat, a barrier model can be constructed, focusing on critical chains of the process or production to be interrupted. It will lead to interventions for which politics must be willing to bear the costs. For to refute there is a threat, the adversaries modus operandi (AMO) are broken into visible activities during the preparation and execution of the hostile act. It is monitored though suspicious indicators, in which it is tried to refute that these indicators belong to a certain AMO. It seems suited to protect people and objects – like airports. For to refute there is no threat, the threat is broken down into its composing variables. For each variable, assumptions are formulated as if there is no threat. Subsequently, it is tried to falsify these assumptions. It seems suited for a wide range of issues, and can include both events and drivers in its analysis. [1] The author thanks Ludo Block and Danny Pronk for their comments and suggestions.