Abstract
Routine vaccination against smallpox among the general public was discontinued more than three decades ago, resulting in a population that is increasingly susceptible to infection. Moreover, the likelihood of re-introduction of eradicated diseases, such as smallpox, increases with time primarily due to the rapid advancement of biotechnology. Our analysis outlines the relative contribution of each component to the total cost of immunisation as it compares replicating and non-replicating smallpox vaccines for the first time. We calculated the total cost of immunising one person using a replicating vaccine such as ACAM2000 was $139, while using a non-replicating vaccine (IMVAMUNE®) cost $115. Overall, the analysis indicates that the main cost component differences of replicating and non-replicating vaccines are made up of the need for screening, follow-up visit, adverse events, reimbursement and compensation when using replicating vaccines. These costs are almost perfectly balanced against the higher cost of goods, reduced productivity loss and the need for an extra vaccination visit when using a non-replicating vaccine. With the availability of a new vaccine option, preparedness planners will benefit from this analysis to support evidence-based decision-making when preparing a safe, efficacious and cost-effective stockpile and immunisation programme against smallpox.
Highlights
Infectious disease threats are a continuous challenge for society and the emergency services sector, and may originate from both naturally occurring and deliberately introduced pathogens and toxins
This conundrum is epitomised by smallpox, a highly lethal disease caused by the variola virus, which is transmitted from person to person facilitated by a declining herd immunity
Vaccines are made from various vaccinia virus strains, which are closely related to variola virus
Summary
Infectious disease threats are a continuous challenge for society and the emergency services sector, and may originate from both naturally occurring and deliberately introduced pathogens and toxins. The likelihood of re-introduction of eradicated diseases, such as smallpox, is partly fuelled by laboratory safety transgressions and increases with time primarily due to the rapid advancement of biotechnology (Becker et al, 2008; Cello, Paul, & Wimmer, 2002; Gaudioso et al, 2011; Gibson et al, 2008) This is corroborated by a recent WHO report that concluded, ‘given the ability to recreate the variola virus using synthetic biology techniques, the destruction of the remaining stocks of variola virus at the two WHO Collaborating Centres would not irrevocably destroy the virus’ (World Health Organization [WHO], 2015)
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
