Tożsamość etyka, czyli uprawianie etyki jako problem moralny

Abstract

This article may be included in the category of conviction ethics. In it the author considers the problem of the moral evaluation of ethical activity as a potential moral mentor. Ethics, even reductionist and naturalist ethics, which polemicize with eudaimonism, has been dominated by the ideal of “practical philosophy”, which assumes that a moral theory can be morally edifying. Whether they support or oppose this program, ethicists continue to revolve around the idea of “practical philosophy”, making their own intellectual contribution to the quality of moral life. However, this idea leads to doubts of a moral nature because of the ambiguous position of the moral mentor, who formulates general ideas but refrains from making concrete moral verdicts. Yet the goal of “practical philosophy” is the potential formulation of criteria regarding the moral good, and thus making moral evaluations. However, it does not accomplish this task and does not even intend to. The attachment to evaluational is an archaic and dogmatic feature of classical ethical systems, which consists in their focusing not on concrete acts, but on motives and consequences. The article points out the moral difficulties that arise from the classical attitude of ethics and also the objectionable features of ethical theories, if they are to be applied to the justification of action. The eudaimonistic, hedonistic, deontological discourses, as well as others, are subjected to moral evaluation. In general the article intends to inaugurate the meta-ethical perspective in ethics.