Torture, Interrogation, Security, and Psychology: Absolutistic versus Complex Thinking

Abstract

How psychologists and their organizations should deal with the practice of torture (e.g., Costanzo, Gerrity, & Lykes, 2006) is not a new concern. Responding to a spate of accusations in the early 1980s, APA established a Subcommittee on Psychological Concerns Related to Torture, which I chaired. The subcommittee’s report (Suedfeld, 1987) reviewed the available evidence concerning connections between psychology and torture, and led to the APA Resolution Against Torture and a joint resolution by the two APAs (American Psychological Association, 1984). The subcommittee’s work also motivated me to organize and edit an even more wide-ranging examination of the relationships between psychology and torture (Suedfeld, 1990). Because of my history of interest, involvement, and knowledge of the issue now under consideration, I have seen many of the current arguments before. I agree with those who, like Costanzo et al., have argued that interrogations should be as humane as possible, that torture is abhorrent and can result in long-lasting physical and psychological damage to victims and even to some torturers, and that it is highly appropriate for psychologists to try to minimize the use of torture and to ameliorate the damage that it causes. Nevertheless, I am surprised by the absolutistic comments now appearing in psychology journals and newsletters. Leaving aside the use of torture to punish people, to enforce submission to political or religious orthodoxy, or to extract confessions of guilt, I believe that the arguments raised so far concerning