Torture by Non-state Actors

Abstract

Abstract In legal discourse, ‘torture’ is a term used to describe the deliberate infliction of severe physical or mental pain and suffering upon a person. One controversial aspect of the legal definition of torture has been the status of the perpetrator, whose acts are relevant for the purposes of the torture definition under international law. This ambiguity came to the forefront in the judgment of the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme Court in R v. Reeves Taylor, where the Court ruled that the category of persons ‘acting in an official capacity’ (under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which implements the United Nations Convention against Torture) included members of armed groups, if those groups exercise governmental authority over a civilian population in a territory under their control. This article relies on R v. Reeves Taylor as a gateway for a wider analysis of four fundamental inquiries into the definition and operation of the crime of torture: (i) the rationales underlying the international criminal repression of torture; (ii) the rules (including the UN Convention as well as other rules) which give expression to different rationales; (iii) the spectrum of actors whose acts can constitute torture under different rationales and rules; and (iv) the wider implications of expanding the spectrum of possible perpetrators.