Topica universalis. Eine Modellgeschichte humanistischer und barocker Wissenschaft (review)

Abstract

BOOK REVIEWS 257 This dichotomy leads Marrone to treat Aristotelianism as a "this-worldly line" which utilizes "logical disputation" (97, 127, 263) in opposition to Neoplatonism, which is other-worldly and relies on metaphors (2o3, 264). So in Marrone's analysis anything concerning sensation or the physical world is Aristotelian and anything concerning divine illumination is an Augustinian metaphor (cf. a77-8o; z95-2oo; 264-.266). But Neoplatonists often explain sensation by identifying Aristotle's view of sensation as the lowest form of knowledge with Plato's view that sensation occasions knowledge by triggering a recollection by the mind of a higher order of being illuminated by God. Thus Neoplatonists do not oppose Plato and Aristotle but attempt to unite them. Indeed, it is a version of just this "occasionalism" that, according to Marrone himself, accounts for sensation in both William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste (65-73; 2o5). Perhaps part of the problem here is that initially (and rightly) Marrone asserts an Aristotelian "taxonomy" of questions concerning truth 09)- But in his analysis, taxonomy , the classification of problems, quickly (and without further argument) turns into the substance itself of a position. Consequently, on Marrone's own analysis these two thinkers seem either grossly inadequate in their Aristotelianism or a hodgepodge of Aristotelian and Augustinian elements which do not go together in any fully coherent way (72-73 passim.). Here rather than in the texts lies the origin of Marrone's final conclusion that "thinkers threw in their lot with Aristotle before realizing all that it entailed and their solutions reflect this fact" (29o-91) . The strength of Marrone's book, in fact, appears in his actual analysis of texts, much of which can stand independently of his own general historical thesis. For example, toward the end of his discussion of the problem of knowledge of complex principles proper according to Robert Grosseteste, Marrone examines Grosseteste's theory of the acquisition of first principles. Although Marrone, recalling his main thesis, calls this process "worldy almost material" (266), he provides a convincing and fully Augustinian analysis whch indicates clearly Grosseteste's influence on Bonaventure . Here "the universal was gradually abstracted as knowledge passed from the power of sense through the imaginative power, estimative power, and memory to the highest of all, the reason or intellect" (267; for the origin of this doctrine cf. Plato, Philebus, and, for its later development, cf. Bonaventure's The Mind's Road to God, Chap. ~). Indeed, it is only because Marrone is so "honest" with the text that the problems with his main thesis are so obvious. HELE~ S. LANG Trinity College Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Topica universalis. Eine ModeUgeschichte humanistischer und barockerWissen~chaft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, x983. Pp. XXIX + 33o. Dr. Schmidt-Biggemann's study approaches a very complex and difficult subject which has received relatively little previous coherent scholarly attention. He enters into the vast treatises of universal learning and universal method which proliferated 258 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY especially during the seventeenth century. The subject is a daunting one, for not only are the works in question extremely long, but they encompass the entire range of human learning. They frequently go under such names as encyclopaedia, polyhistor, scientia universalis, or mathesis universalis. They come to the fore about the time that the scholastic synthesis was beginning to fall apart: such treatises were meant to be much more inclusive than even the most comprehensive of the scholastic philosophy courses, which even in their most general form left many subjects unaccounted for. Schmidt-Biggemann's book is divided into five main sections. The first deals with the development of humanistic logic, especially the theme of topica universalis as a generalized scheme of knowledge from Agricola to Ramus. Next comes "Aristotelians and Ramists," which traces the elaborations of systematic knowledge in figures such as Zabarella, Timpler, and Keckermann, which culminated in Alsted and Comenius, both of whom are given substantial treatment. Third is a section on the Lultist direction of thought, centering on Kircher and Leibniz, in whom the whole tradition culminates. A rather briefer section "Nature and Utopia: The Limits of Polyhistory" focusses upon the systems of Bacon and Campanella. Finally, there is an...