Top Executive Team Remuneration, Performance and Governance in the Australian Finance Sector

Abstract

Research Question/Issue: The finance industry has come under increased scrutiny during the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009. The potential impact of remuneration plans on excessive risk taking is one factor that has been argued to play a role in the GFC. This study makes four contributions to our understanding of top executive team pay in Australia and its association with firm performance. First, while prior research focuses on CEO pay in the sector, we examine both the level and structure of executive remuneration across the top executive group. Second, we document the association between pay and a range of accounting and market performance measures, incorporating performance measures unique to the finance sector. Third, the study also determines whether compensation committee governance plays a role in this relationship. Finally, we document differences in pay structure before and after the GFC, and examine if the association between pay and performance changes around this event. Research Findings/Insights: Utilising a sample of 1,178 firm year observations for 73 firms between 2005 and 2010, we find that the level of all measures of remuneration for the CEO is significantly higher than for other executives. The proportion of total pay contributed by cash bonus declines for the senior executive group, and salary and LTIPs increase post-GFC. We observe a positive relationship between accounting measures of performance and cash bonus and total pay for both the CEO and the executive team. LTIPs are associated with ROE for all executives. Consistent with prior research, larger firms pay higher levels of all forms of compensation. We observe an increased alignment between both bonus and LTIP, and performance post-GFC. We also find that while governance itself is not associated with compensation in general, good governance reduces total and bonus compensation to the executive team. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to research documenting tournament incentives by finding that the pay differential between CEO pay and that of lower-level executives is used to encourage performance of lower level executives, and not necessarily evidence of CEOs using power or influence to extract excessive rents. We also find that committee monitoring provides limited explanation for the alignment of pay and performance across the executive team. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our results provide important policy implications for the finance sector. We find that, despite regulatory intervention, there is currently no alignment between firm risk and executive pay, and there is a heavy reliance on cash salary and bonus rather than long-term incentives. This provides evidence of a need to strengthen regulatory enforcement, and a need to improve firm compliance with prudential regulation.