Tonality between Rule and Repertory; Or, Riemann's Functions—Beethoven's Function

Abstract

Should tonality be located in a theoretical principle or in musical works? The quick answer, “Both,” often underestimates the difficulty of mediating between the two. In most reflections one side necessarily takes precedence over the other. Hugo Riemann, whose concept of harmonic function contributed significantly to the discourse of tonality in the nineteenth century, belongs to the tradition that regards tonality primarily as a theoretical principle. His analyses of Beethoven's piano sonatas (1918–19) have been regarded as “exemplary proof” of his theoretical principle. If that is the case, however, the “proof” can only count as partly successful: a number of Riemann's analytical observations required modifications of his theoretical principles to account for the musical processes. This article examines to what extent this analytical exercise in turn exerted an influence on Riemann's theoretical principles, and to what extent Riemann's theory of function changed after this encounter with Beethoven's sonatas. As it turns out, some of the modifications would have threatened the integrity of Riemann's musical system, especially concerning the status of third-relations. (Intriguingly, these aporetic modifications grapple with ideas that have gained currency more recently in Neo-Riemannian thinking.) More generally, complicating Riemann's theory of tonality in this way may help us negotiate the problem of mediation between theoretical principle and musical repertory and examine afresh the dynamic interrelationship between the diverse components that make up theories of tonality.