To Win Wars, Correct the Army's Political Blind Spot

Abstract

Abstract: Within increasingly complex operational environments, the Army's apolitical approach to war represents a political blind spot. This condition undermines the Army's ability to match military means to political objectives and to set the conditions for victory. To correct this blind spot, the Army must leverage reflective conversations about the political aspects of conflict. To develop this ability in its soldiers, the Army should increase its use of mentoring. ********** As part of the post-Iraq-post-Afghanistan reset, much has been written about how the US Army fights and whether its current doctrine is capable of producing victory. In response to these discussions, and the wars themselves, much has also been written about the need for the Army to become a learning organization, one capable of innovating in the face of increasingly complex operational environments. Most of these debates are insightful, yet miss the mark. They fail to identify the central cause that underlies the unsatisfying outcomes in Afghanistan and Iraq and that risks future failures--the Army's political blind spot. The problem is not how the Army fights nor how it learns to fight. The problem is how the Army understands the fight. Often, it does not. Too often, the Army fails to consider and develop a tailored understanding of the political context, that is, specific political conditions, the range of desired ends sought by actual or potential belligerents or other strategic foreign audiences, associated with a given conflict. This failure makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the Army to effectively apply its doctrine in pursuit of victory. This blind spot springs from an apolitical approach to warfare. It leaves the Army unable to appreciate the political conditions in which conflicts occur. This situation cannot be remedied through the Army's formal educational systems. Organizational and budgetary constraints make such remedies impossible. Formal educational programs must focus first on the delivery of formative skill sets and knowledge, rather than transformative understandings of theory, critical thinking, and the causal logic necessary to assess political conditions. To correct the Army's political blind spot, informal methods must be leveraged. Army-wide reflective conversations about the political aspects of past and potential conflicts are needed. Such conversations should be undertaken in the spirit of the Army's process for crafting strategic leadership. They should be an open dialogue of alternative points of view, seeking to explore the recursive effects of political conditions and military action. (1) These discussions should be carried out via professional publications, The Army Press, and social media-and facilitated through personal mentoring. The increased use of such reflective conversations will increase the Army's ability to appreciate the political context within which wars occur--and enhance its ability to set the conditions for victory in the twenty-first century. Political Roots of Recent, and Potentially Failure Over the last two years, counter-insurgency debates have given way to discussions of why the Army failed--or in Lieutenant General Daniel Bolger's view, lost--in Afghanistan and Iraq. (2) In Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future, Colonel Matthew Morton highlights the importance of this dialogue: [c]onclusions about the recent era of conflict will affect US officers as they ascend to higher ranks... He notes how future senior officers understand their experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq will affect the advice they give civilian leaders. (3) It will also affect how they fight future conflicts, and even their understanding of modern war. Major Jason Warren notes that the Army's exceptional tactical prowess has paradoxically led to strategic impotence. Warren cites the rise of a centurion mindset as the principal reason the Army has repeatedly failed to achieve national objectives. …