Abstract

The UK Government has placed increasing emphasis on the use of performance assessment schemes with the aim of improving the delivery of public services. An example of such schemes is the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA). The CPA subjects English local authorities to annual audits and the collection of hundreds of performance indicators to arrive at final ratings that lead to corresponding rewards and sanctions. This article shows that the CPA does not provide a reliable measure of performance given that it does not consider the external constraints that authorities face in improving their performance. Using panel data analysis we find that deprivation affects authorities’ performance in all the core services they provide such as education, housing, libraries, environment and social care. Evidence that suggests sanctioning authorities that perform badly, without considering their local circumstances, risks the danger of perpetuating the delivery of poor services particularly in deprived areas. To avoid this ‘unintended consequence’, the article offers three options by which the CPA scheme could be improved. Points for practitioners With the aim of improving the delivery of public services, a wide range of performance metrics have been devised. In particular the UK uses the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) scheme, which audits and collects performance indicators on local governments to arrive at ratings used to reward and sanction. This article finds that sanctioning authorities that perform badly, without considering their local circumstances, risks perpetuating the delivery of poor services particularly in deprived areas. The article advances the understanding of the extent to which deprivation affects performance and provides practitioners with strategies to improve performance assessment schemes.

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