To the theory of collective actions. Part I. Articulation of the problem

Abstract

The subject of this research is the barriers that must be overcome by a collective of individual for the effective use of their self-governance and self-organization resources. Until the moment when Elinor Ostrom was awarded with the Nobel Prize, the majority of economists and politicians were assured that a collective is incapable of managing the common resource effectively. Most popular opinion was reflected in a metaphor: the tragedy of communities. This opinion was traced by an  entire number of theoretical models and concepts. Due to high incidence of pessimistic view, the corresponding issues were considered resolved, and thus, were displaced to the periphery of economic science. The falseness of such views was established in the course of field and experimental research of E. Ostrom. This article analyzes the factors that served as the foundation for formation of pessimistic views upon ability of the collective to efficient management of common resource. On the reasons consists in inappropriate identification of the regime of open accesses with communal property. Another one – in the axiom on the inability of a collective, which members pursue egoistic intentions, to efficient usage of common resource in the regime of self-governance and self-organization. These prerequisites led to a conclusion on the need for privatization or nationalization of such resource. The goal of this work consists in theoretical analysis of such opportunities that allow a collective to successfully resolve the faced social dilemmas, when each of them tries to achieve a maximal individual profit.