To the Moon and Back: Reexamining Presidential Decision-Making and the Apollo Program

Abstract

Why did President John F. Kennedy call on the nation to send Americans to the moon? And why did his successors see the expensive and risky Apollo program to completion even after his death? Drawing from the literature on presidential decision-making, I argue Kennedy's announcement was both ordinary and epiphenomenal. Using archival materials spanning the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, this article augments existing research and contends the 35th president constrained his own options by criticizing the outgoing Eisenhower administration for allowing a “missile gap” during the 1960 presidential campaign. After learning it did not exist, JFK's own crisis rhetoric set expectations and forced him to compete with the Soviets in a new arena at the height of the Cold War. His assassination made it politically risky for his successors to alter the lunar program, relegating both Johnson and Nixon to claim residual credit and avoid blame for diminishing the American crewed space exploration program. Reevaluating the historical role of the president in achieving one of the most significant government-led endeavors in history reveals how Kennedy's past actions inadvertently drove the development of space policy at mid-century.