Abstract

This paper brings together Žižek's Bartleby politics with the praxis of organic intellectuals emerging out of the “Bougainville crisis”, in order to generate a new vantage point for theorizing anti-colonial resistance to state violence. Bartleby politics, it is argued, conceptualizes how socio-symbolic orders naturalize their existence, and the strategies required to disrupt this completeness of power, so we can begin again. Applying this approach, it is argued during colonization metropolitan powers shatter the permanency of indigenous socio-symbolic orders, by situating them within a wider (contrived) teleological historical sequence. However, the metropolitan power's capacity to manage this risky enterprise—where the possibility of possibility emerges—is shaped by anti-colonial resistance. This resistance can shift a teleological moment to a contingent moment, where multiple vectors of history are opened up by the colonized “subjects,” that go beyond the set sequence offered by the colonial power. One of the most radical forms of violence colonized “subjects” can inflict on the colonial powers during this open historical moment, it is argued, is refusal. Refusal, that is to negotiate the terms and conditions of incorporation into Empire, and instead unilaterally setting a different historical course. The violence refusal inflicts on Empire, and the greater violence Empire inflicts back, will be examined through the case study of the Bougainville war.

Highlights

  • The endurance and stability of the capitalist politico-legal order is premised, like all orders, on the negation of its own temporality

  • A thorough account of a Žižekian theory of law is beyond the scope of this paper, by considering Žižek’s Bartleby politics within the context of his approach to law we seek to illuminate a number of important claims about revolutionary politics that enable a dialogue between Žižek’s Bartleby politics and the philosophy and actions of revolutionaries in Bougainville

  • The law and the politico-legal order it cements, according to Žižek, is founded on a violent crime: “‘At the beginning’ of the law there is a certain ‘outlaw’ . . . the ultimate truth about the reign of law is that of a usurpation, and all classical politicophilosophical thought rests on the disavowal of this violent act of foundation” (Žižek 1991: 204)

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Summary

Introduction

The endurance and stability of the capitalist politico-legal order is premised, like all orders, on the negation of its own temporality. A thorough account of a Žižekian theory of law is beyond the scope of this paper, by considering Žižek’s Bartleby politics within the context of his approach to law we seek to illuminate a number of important claims about revolutionary politics that enable a dialogue between Žižek’s Bartleby politics and the philosophy and actions of revolutionaries in Bougainville These insights include the founding violence of law; the law as split between its public message and an obscene hidden law; the temporality of revolutionary action; and the disruptive power of revolutionary praxis

The Founding Violence of the Law
The Two Faces of the Law
Conclusion
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