To Link or Not to Link? Changing the Bargaining Structure with an Issue Linkage Strategy

Abstract

This paper addresses the question of when and why states use issue linkage as a bargaining strategy - changing the set of issues that characterize the bargaining agenda. It argues that a state is likely to do so: (1) if the current set of issues does not foster an exchange of concessions that could lead to agreement, and (2) if a state faces a costly alternative to agreement,and thus places signi cant value on reaching an agreement. Empirical rules for measuring these abstract concepts are presented, and an original large-N dataset of multilateral climate change conferences held from 2007- 2010 is constructed to test these hypotheses. I then illustrate the hypothesized e ects at work with a case analysis of the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference. I conclude by discussing the implications of these results for future work.