To Lie or Not to Lie in Non-Cooperative User-Centric Networks: Is Lying Worth It?

Abstract

This paper presents a load-aware network selection model intended to help users to determine whether or not to connect to a macro cell (MC) or a WiFi access point (AP) in non-cooperative user-centric networks. The problem is formulated as a game theoretic model in which users selfishly maximize their throughput. Unlike in most existing work, we do not assume that users have complete information about the other users’ dynamics, which makes it more realistic in a communication network with distributed users. Then, because the network selection decision depends crucially on truthful reporting of channel states by the users, we explore the idea of non-cooperative users sending signals that are likely to induce the scheduler to behave in a manner beneficial to them. We provide five procedures which consist of introducing hierarchy among the users reflecting their channel quality and dividing them into groups interfering with each other, but not within themselves. Having done this, we allow them to sequentially choose their preferred network. We also propose a solution to compel users to reveal the truthful signals to the macro eNodeB (MeNb) by designing an additional immunity parameter mainly meant to keep lying users from harming truthful users. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the additional immunity parameter does not only decrease the gain of liars, but it further improves the overall system performance. We provide extensive system level simulation results comparing our procedures between themselves and with traditional schemes. It is shown that the proposed solutions outperform classical approaches in almost every respect.