“To H-1B or Not to H-1B?” Social Closure and Inequality in Immigrant Work Visa Approvals

Abstract

This study examines how immigration policies, as implemented by U.S. government agents, shape migration and employment outcomes of skilled foreign nationals. Using a unique dataset, which encompasses the entire population of 1,441,856 U.S. H-1B temporary work visa requests evaluated by government agents from May 2005 to April 2010, I assess whether agents’ visa approval and denial decisions are affected by immigrants’ sending country characteristics. Through this program, government agents adjudicate a key institutional boundary: access to the American labor market, through their decision to confer or withhold legal standing to potential U.S. immigrants. While no formal evaluation criteria pertains to immigrant country of origin, I nonetheless find that immigrant workers from sending countries with lower levels of economic development are less likely to receive approvals for initial employment in the United States, all else equal. Further, and in support of social closure theories, I find these differences are associated with visa evaluations that confer legal U.S. labor market access (through initial and continuing employment requests), but not labor market mobility (requests to change employers or jobs). The paper concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for theories of inequality and labor market mobility, in addition to practical considerations regarding the efficient and fair administration of U.S. immigration policy.