To Engage or Not to Engage? Explaining the Logic of the US’s China Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era

Abstract

The United States’ (US) changing policy towards China has become one of the most attractive issues in contemporary international politics. To explore the reasons underlying these changes, existing studies adopt four schools of explanation, i.e., status competition, institutional competition, failure of engagement, and domestic factors. Each school provides valuable theoretical insights. However, existing studies have obvious problems with single attribution and, thus, fail to formulate a causal mechanism explaining the long-term trajectory of the US’s China strategy. By recategorizing America’s unilateral perception of China as reformist, revolutionary, status quo and positionalist, which extends beyond the revisionist-status quo dichotomy, this article develops a systemic explanatory model and process tracing of the transition of US’s China policy during the post-Cold War period to explain the theoretical logic underlying the changes. This article argues that the positional change and the US’s unilateral perception of China are the two main factors triggering changes in the US’s China strategy. China’s foreign behavior, as the intervening variable, strengthens or weakens the government’s perception of China and, thus, determines the US’s strategic choices, i.e., whether to pursue a policy of containment, competition, precaution, congagement, engagement, or accommodation. Four comparative case studies are presented to demonstrate how this article’s explanatory model can be applied.