Abstract
AbstractThis paper investigates the insider trading before scheduled versus unscheduled corporate announcements to explore how corporate insiders utilise their private information in response to the time‐varying liquidity trading. Using a comprehensive insider trading database, we show that: (1) the insider's propensity to trade increases in the amount of liquidity trading before both the scheduled and unscheduled announcements; (2) insiders buy (sell) more before positive (negative) announcements; and (3) insider purchases are more profitable before unscheduled announcements than before scheduled ones. They suggest that insiders time their trades around scheduled and unscheduled announcements to exploit the varying extent of liquidity trading.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
