Time to change lanes: How pro‐market reforms affect informal ventures' formalization speed

Abstract

AbstractResearch SummaryWe argue that pro‐market reforms encourage informal ventures to obtain formal registration quickly by altering the relative costs and benefits of joining the formal sector. We furthermore contend that this reform effect is shaped by several contextual factors such that venture embeddedness and market position increase the costs of leaving the informal sector, weakening the effect of pro‐market reforms. Although foreign competition may make the formal sector more competitive and dampen the effect of pro‐market reforms, larger informal economy may induce informal ventures to stay put. Results based on a sample of multicountry ventures support our arguments, suggesting that pro‐market reforms can speed up informal ventures' formalization processes.Managerial SummaryWe analyze the relationship between pro‐market reforms and informal ventures' formalization speed. We find that pro‐market reforms compel informal entrepreneurs to seek the benefits and to move to the formal sector quickly. Also, more embedded ventures and ventures with larger market positions are less responsive to pro‐market reforms as these ventures incur higher costs in leaving the informal sector. Since strong foreign competition makes the formal sector less attractive for nondominant entities, informal ventures may find pro‐market reforms less attractive in countries with heightened foreign competition. Ventures in countries with more intense foreign competition are less susceptible to the effect of pro‐market reforms. Overall, while pro‐market reforms provide ample incentives to formalize, informal ventures are not uniformly incentivized to do so given these contingences.