Time, Power, and Democratic Transitions

Abstract

This study explores the impact of shifting power distributions among contending domestic groups on the dynamics of democratic transitions. A timing game is specified to demonstrate the vital influence exerted by relative power distributions on when an opposition is likely to mobilize and when an authoritarian leader is willing to negotiate. The model suggests that democratic transitions occur under conditions of relative power parity between the authoritarian government and the political opposition. The hypothesized relationship is validated empirically on 17 Latin American countries in the period from 1950 to 1990. The study also highlights the factors that affect the peaceful or conflictual nature of a transition process, such as the degree to which domestic opposition groups are dissatisfied with an authoritarian status quo, the risk propensities of political leaders, and the anticipated costs of domestic or civil conflict. The theoretical and empirical results of this study provide several significant insights and substantive implications for explaining as well as anticipating the timing of democratic transitions.